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Beyond genetic discrimination. Problems and perspectives of a 






In the recent past a number of empirical studies provided evidence that increasing 
genetic knowledge leads to new forms of exclusion, disadvantage and stigmatisation. 
As a consequence, many states have inaugurated special legislation to fight “genetic 
discrimination”.  
 
This article focuses on some theoretical, normative and practical problems in the 
scientific and political debate on genetic discrimination. It puts forward the thesis that 
the existing antidiscrimination approach is based on the implicit idea that genes are 
the essence of (human) life. Since genes are held responsible for individual 
development and personal identity, genetic discrimination is granted a privileged legal 
status in comparison to other forms of discrimination. As a result the analytical and 
political concentration on processes of genetic discrimination may reinforce the 
“geneticization” of body, illness and deviance. 
 
Beyond genetic discrimination. Problems and perspectives of a contested notion 
 
The sequencing of the human genome at the beginning of the new century marked a 
symbolic milestone in the progress of genetics.1 In the “post-genomic” era genetic 
research is about to transform concepts of health, illness and the body, and the 
practices of medicine and public health. Genetic tests already have been developed to 
identify the presence of particular alleles or polymorphisms that are linked to certain 
diseases. As the range and accuracy of these tests increase, many scholars anticipate a 
future when anyone may obtain genetic profile that can identify conditions for which 
he or she may be at elevated risk. Such knowledge should enable an individual to take 
preventive steps such as medication, medical monitoring, prophylactic surgery, or 
behavioural and environmental modification that may be wholly or partially effective 
to eliminating the onset of diseases.2 
 
As with many other new technologies, the implementation of genetic technology 
raises a number of social problems. One area of concern is “genetic discrimination”. 
As a series of empirical studies in different countries have shown the use of genetic 
information may lead to new forms of exclusion, disadvantaging and stigmatisation.3 
The spectrum of genetic discrimination ranges from disadvantages in work life via 
problems with insurance policies through to difficulties with adoption agencies. In 
some cases a person was turned down for a job because there were signs of a possible 
later illness. Likewise, health and life insurers terminated contracts or refused to 
conclude these if their (potential) clients were suspected of bearing the risk of a 
congenital disease. In other cases, couples were not allowed to adopt children if one 
of the two had a predisposition for a genetic illness. Experiences of genetic 
discrimination were also reported from healthcare agencies, the education sector and 
the military.4 
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The empirical studies on the problem of genetic discrimination have not gone 
unnoticed. In the scholarly debate and policy discussions in society, much has been 
made of the danger of a “biological underclass”.5 People who were disadvantaged, 
pathologised and stigmatised simply owing to their genetic structure. The fear of a 
“new form of social prejudice”6 led to numerous attempts to regulate the problem. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s a series of legislative initiatives and statements on 
the part of inter- and supranational organizations and commissions have been 
forthcoming to protect people from genetic discrimination. For example, the Council 
of Europe’s Convention on Biomedicine (Art. 11), UNESCO’s Declaration on the 
Human Genome (Art. 6), and the EU’s Charter on Fundamental Rights (Art. 21) all 
explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of genetic features. Likewise, many 
nations have issued regulations designed to ensure that no one is disadvantaged on the 
basis of his or her genetic constitution. Thus, in some countries, including Austria and 
Belgium, genetic discrimination is in principle forbidden. In the United States, special 
laws were resolved at an early date by individual states of the Union and by the 
federal government. In Germany, among others, there is currently discussion on 
additional legal initiatives to protect against genetic discrimination.  
 
However, it has since become ever more apparent that the concept of genetic 
discrimination, as is used in scholarly studies and in legal texts, entails various 
theoretical, normative and practical difficulties. I wish in this essay to address in 
greater depth four problematic areas that reveal significant gaps or weaknesses in the 
debate on genetic discrimination: Discrepancies in the use of the concept of 
discrimination in research practice (1); empirical shortcomings that mean central areas 
of genetic discrimination are not covered (2); conceptual problems in defining the 
special scientific status of genetic information (3); and finally normative 
ambivalences as the notion that genetic data should be subject to a more 
comprehensive protection compared with non-genetic information leads to unjustified 
unequal treatment of persons affected (4). The central argument I shall advance is that 
the theoretical and political-legal critique of practices of genetic discrimination 
frequently itself rests on the implicit notion that genes fundamentally influence human 
existence and form the core of our respective personalities. I suspect that this critique 
covertly relies on an essentialist concept of a genetic program that is deemed 
responsible for individual development and personal identity. In summary I shall 
present some conclusions drawn from this observation with regard to further scholarly 
and political discussion on genetic discrimination (5). 
 
1.  Definitional discrepancies: scope and content of genetic discrimination 
 
In the scholarly literature and also in the media and the relevant laws genetic 
discrimination signifies the unequal treatment of people owing to actual or suspected 
genetic differences from the “normal” genome. Here, genetic discrimination is strictly 
distinguished from discrimination owing to a disability or illness.7 All the relevant 
empirical studies rely on this definition of genetic discrimination, but the application 
of it in research practice has varied greatly – something that undermines the 
comparability of research findings.  
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Lapham et al. use a very broad concept of discrimination for their work; it includes 
not only presymptomatic cases, but also cases in which the persons in question have 
already fallen ill.8 As a result, phenotypical and genotypical characteristics are both 
used as the basis for defining the presence of genetic discrimination.9 Most other 
studies seek only to speak of genetic discrimination against the persons concerned if 
the symptoms of the illness are very mild or do not constitute a disability or restriction 
in performance.10 By contrast, an extremely narrow concept of discrimination is 
utilized by Mark A. Hall and Stephen S. Rich in their study, as they only take into 
account cases in which the persons concerned were completely presymptomatic, in 
other words in which the illness was in no manner manifest yet. The different 
concepts of discrimination lead to contrary findings: While Hall and Rich had 
difficulty documenting even a single case of genetic discrimination, the study by 
Lapham et al. states that almost half of those polled had experienced genetic 
discrimination.11  
 
Not just the scope, but also the substance of the concept of discrimination is a bone of 
scholarly contention. In the relevant studies, genetic discrimination is regularly 
construed as the “unjustified unequal treatment of persons owing to their genetic 
characteristics”.12 The literature usually takes a critical perspective: The implicit 
assumption is that unequal treatment owing to factual or suspected genetic differences 
is legally impermissible and/or morally objectionable. However, in addition to this 
majority view, there are other opinions that consider genetic discrimination a factually 
legitimate form of risk differentiation.13 An extreme position in this regard is taken in 
the libertarian argument advanced by Colin S. Diver and Jane Maslow Cohen. They 
contend that the unequal treatment of human beings owing to genetic factors is not 
only morally unproblematic and legally permissible, but also socially necessary as an 
economic instrument of resource allocation and risk calculation. From this standpoint, 
government prohibitions on genetic discrimination prevent the efficient market 
regulation that requires a “regime of genetic transparency”.14  
 
Needless to say, the conceptual discrepancies are not only of interest as regards 
research strategies and at the theoretical level, but are of great significance for 
legislative practice and social policy: Is genetic discrimination a legitimate means of 
risk differentiation in order to generate economic growth and prosperity or a social 
evil that calls for corresponding government measures to protect persons from it? And 
if the latter is the case, what individuals and groups with what illnesses and/or risks of 
illness should be protected against discrimination, and in what way? How broad or 
narrow should the circle of those be who are to benefit from legal protection? 
 
2.  Empirical deficits: “Everyday eugenics” and indirect discrimination  
 
The studies to date that deal with the problem of genetic discrimination have a clear 
emphasis. They concentrate on institutional actors disadvantaging individuals and 
their relatives. This analytical focus means that important practical areas of genetic 
discrimination do not get equal attention. I shall scrutinize two empirical deficits more 
closely here: the focus on institutional actors and the neglect of indirect forms of 
discrimination.15 
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2.1.  Focus on institutional actors and asymmetric decision-making  
 
So far studies of genetic discrimination mainly focused on institutional actors, on the 
one hand, and individuals and relatives, on the other. This juxtaposition is too strongly 
entrenched in the juridical frame of committer/victim. However correct and important 
it may be to expose discriminating practices by insurance companies, employers, 
adoption agencies and other organizations, this disregards a decisive arena of genetic 
discrimination: disrespect and stigmatisation by family, friends and fellow human 
beings. This “everyday discrimination” is systematically ignored in the studies to date, 
meaning a key field of genetic discrimination remains excluded.  
 
In addition to this analytical gap there is another problem: Literature on genetic 
discrimination tends to concentrate on the “negative” pattern of litigation: on coercive 
measures and asymmetric decision-making processes. The guiding idea here relates to 
organizations that refuse to sign contracts or reject qualifications. Thus, the studies 
exclude to investigate to what extent formally voluntary options for action and 
symmetrical decision-making situations can have a discriminating effect. A core 
element of the new genetic knowledge consists precisely of the fact that it transforms 
natural constrains into new individual options – options that may engender new 
constrains. Scholars discern a transition from a compulsory eugenics to a more 
indirect form of control and guidance of individuals, something the academic debate 
has termed “voluntary”16 “individualist”17, “liberal”18 or “everyday eugenics”19. 
Those critical accounts point to the fact that individual decisions and private choices 
may, taken collectively, have negative social effects and create new pressures on 
reproductive behaviour. While some scholars resist the idea that human genetics 
represents a disguised or a new kind of eugenics, the question remains whether the 
phenomenon of genetic discrimination is restricted to explicit prohibitions and rare 
exceptions, or may also result from “normal” risk assessments, “rational” concepts of 
health and the idea of a “self-regulative behavioural management”.20 
 
2.2.  Neglect of indirect mechanisms and structural links 
 
This conceptual problem points to the limits of a person-centred and case-oriented 
notion of discrimination. Alongside discrimination of people who are directly 
confronted by disadvantaging or stigmatisation, forms of “indirect” discrimination 
must also be considered. This should include all factors that indirectly influence the 
persons involved and constrain their scope for decision-making and their options for 
action. While direct genetic discrimination remains a matter of individual cases and 
describes the way in which certain people with genetic characteristics are treated as 
individuals, indirect discrimination refers to social judgments of unworthiness, 
structures of prejudice and forms of disrespect addressed to all members of society.21  
 
A comprehensive analysis of genetic discrimination must also focus on those 
strategies for action with which the persons affected anticipate negative categorization 
by their social environment and adapt their behaviour accordingly. The most effective 
means of pre-empting genetic discrimination entails not drawing genetic risks to the 
attention of other people, let alone institutional actors such as insurance companies or 
employers. This “information control” runs from the choice of spouse via neighbourly 
relations to working life. The persons affected feel the act of excluding their own risk 
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of falling ill and the related fears as a form of compulsion, as a restriction in forms of 
communication, and as the necessity to keep important information on themselves and 
their own future secret from others.22 
 
Moreover, the judgment on unworthiness as is expressed in practices of genetic 
discrimination, also impacts on decisions on reproduction that go far beyond the realm 
of those who are directly affected by the risk of genetic illness. While studies on the 
problem of genetic discrimination to date have concentrated on postnatal genetic tests 
and the disadvantaging of persons already born, it bears asking whether the analysis 
should not also cover the field of prenatal diagnostics (selective abortion on the basis 
of genetic indicators) and pre-implantation diagnostics (deliberate choice of 
genetically “desired” embryos).23 
 
But it does not suffice for a systematic analysis of genetic discrimination to simply 
internally differentiate between various practices of genetic discrimination. We must 
also consider the “structural links” between different forms of discrimination. In this 
way, we can study how forms of genetic discrimination link up with sexist and racist 
practices and mutually reinforce one another.24  
 
As regards the relationship of genetic discrimination and racism, it bears stating that 
some genetic illnesses are encountered more frequently in certain ethnic groups or 
groups of the population than in others. For example, sickle cell anemia occurs more 
frequently among persons of African descent, Tay-Sachs Syndrome is especially 
widespread among Ashkenazi Jews, and most persons with the beta thalassemia gene 
are inhabitants of the Mediterranean rim. Since certain ethnic groups are differently 
susceptible to specific genetic illnesses, there is a danger that members of minorities 
will be associated with such genes and treated pathologically, even if they do not bear 
the particular genetic mutation. For example, sickle-cell anemia in the United States is 
considered a disease of Afro-Americans, although it is to be found just as frequently 
among population groups from the Mediterranean rim.25 There is likewise the danger 
that there will be a disparity in resource allocation and in the public attention on these 
diseases. For example, in the USA research into cystic fibrosis, which affects 
primarily white coloured people, receives far more financial backing than does 
research into sickle cell anemia, even if the latter is far more widespread among the 
population as a whole.26  
 
The practice of gender verification at sports competitions is a striking example of the 
linking of genetic discrimination und sexism. Gender control by genetic testing 
emerged as an issue in the 1960s when there were rumours that men had passed 
themselves off as women to take part in women’s competitions. Despite the intensive 
criticism down through the years, genetic analyses are still undertaken to verify 
gender in sport. However, only women and not men have to have their gender 
verified, and suffer the possible consequences of “failing” such a test. Although 
almost all International Olympic Committees now forego such verification 
procedures, at world championships for some sports gender continues to be 
genetically “tested”. For example, at the Volleyball World Championship in 2002 in 
Germany, all the women were subjected to a genetic analysis if they did not have test 
results from a prior sports competition.27  
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A person-centred and case-oriented concept of discrimination is not able to explore the 
systematic links between racist and sexist practices and ideologies on the one hand, and 
patterns of geneticist interpretation and action, on the other. Genetic discrimination does 
not entail isolated and chance deviations from the norm, individual cases and erroneous 
institutional developments, but it points to social practices that divide persons into 
genetic categories and promote a belief in the determining power of genes.28 
Unfortunately notions of genetic essentialism frequently also shape the analysis and 
critique of genetic discrimination, leading to conceptual confusion on the one hand and 
normative ambivalences on the other.  
 
3.  Conceptual confusions: the exceptional epistemological status of  
 genetic information 
 
Studies on genetic discrimination and legislative initiatives to protect affected persons 
share a common presumption: both assume an exceptional status of genetic 
information in two ways.29 First, there is the claim that genetic information differs 
epistemologically from non-genetic information. From this perspective there is a clear 
scientific line dividing genetic testing from non-genetic procedures, genetic diseases 
from non-genetic conditions. Second, there is the suggestion that genetic information 
should be normatively distinguished from non-genetic information: discrimination on 
the basis of genetic data on the current or future health of a person is then unjust or 
more unjust compared to discrimination on the basis of non-genetic medical 
information. As I shall attempt to show, both assumptions are untenable. I shall focus 
in this section on the justifications for an exceptional epistemological status of genetic 
information, and then in the next section trace the normative problems to which this 
gives rise. 
 
3.1.  Genetic exceptionalism  
 
There are at least three arguments put forward to justify the exceptional (medical) 
position of genetic screening. Genetic analytical procedures are claimed to be more 
precise than other medical tests as they provide predictive information on the health of 
an individual. They are said to allow it to diagnose with certainty or greater 
probability whether a person will fall ill with a specific disease. Second, the results of 
genetic tests are said to enable conclusions to be drawn on the state of health or risk of 
illness of relatives of the person screened. Genetic tests are, thirdly, believed to differ 
from traditional diagnostic techniques and conventional medical methodologies, as 
they purportedly reveal fundamental personal characteristics of the person examined. 
All three criteria thus used to justify “genetic exceptionalism” do not stand up to 
closer scrutiny.30  
 
First, only a very few genetic tests allow predictive statements to be made on future 
illnesses. Genetic illnesses are as a rule characterized by incomplete penetration 
and/or variable expressivity.31 The former relates to the frequency with which genetic 
mutation actually trigger the corresponding disease in the person bearing the gene. In 
the case of complex illnesses such as cancer, Alzheimer’s or diabetes the presence of a 
changed gene does not necessarily lead to illness. For example, proof of a mutation of 
one of the so-called BRCA genes increases the statistical probability of a woman 
developing breast cancer, but the question whether, when and in what way she 
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succumbs to the illness is by no means answered.32 As recent studies have shown, 
even monogenetic illnesses such as cystic fibrosis or Morbus Huntington do not entail 
100% penetration.33  
 
Variable expressivity refers to the fact that the symptoms of one and the same illness 
can differ vastly from one individual to the next, although both possess the same 
mutated gene. In other words, the same DNA mutation can trigger quite different 
clinical symptoms – or none at all; conversely, one and the same disease can be 
triggered by different genetic variations.34 It bears stating here not only that the 
predictive value of genetic information is regularly exaggerated, but also that non-
genetic medical tests provide information on future health risks, such as a HIV test, a 
cholesterol screen, or the proof of an asymptomatic hepatitis B infection. Likewise, 
blood-pressure tests or proof of blood in stool are of great diagnostic importance when 
identifying illnesses at an early stage before the first symptoms of coronary heart 
disease or stomach cancer have arisen.35 
 
As regards the second criterion, it is also difficult to recognize the medical uniqueness 
or even the special status of genetic analyses. As Murray rightly emphasizes, people 
have long since known that their own risk of having an illness increases if the same 
illness has already arisen in their family. Likewise, in the past, doctors have relied on 
information on relatives to supplement their medical knowledge on a particular 
patient. Moreover, a person’s family history has for some time been factored into 
insurance contracts and/or consulted when defining premiums. Genetic tests are, in 
other words, neither the only nor the most important tools for using medical data on 
relatives in order to reach statements on an individual’s health status.36  
 
The third criterion differentiates between a fateful and immutable genetic 
predisposition, on the one hand, and chance and controllable environmental factors, 
on the other. This argument rests on the notion that genes are autonomous and active, 
forming a kind of control centre that steers and regulates the organism.37 This 
assumption is at best a vast simplification if not misleading or false. First, genes are 
not static units, but an integral part of a complicated biochemical network that is 
defined by the dynamic interaction of interdependent actors.38 For this reason, it is an 
impermissible simplification if we assume that a characteristic or function is 
determined in part by heredity and otherwise by environmental influences. This fails 
to consider that genetic changes can also be first acquired in the course of life owing 
to environmental influences and a specific life style.39 Furthermore, there can be no 
simple equation between genetic causality and an inevitable fate and/or non-genetic 
factors and personal scope to take free decisions. Neither do genetic causes of illness 
signal a necessary biological fate, nor are non-genetic conditions in principle easier to 
control than their genetic counterparts or the result of personal choices for which the 
individual is responsible.40 On the contrary, there are also many non-genetic factors 
which we as individuals can by no means control: “If the air we breathe and the water 
we drink are polluted, if our parents or co-workers are heavy smokers, if we are 
reasonably prudent but injured in an accident nonetheless, it is hard to say that we 
bear any significant measure of responsibility for the resulting illness”.41 
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All the three criteria that ostensibly justify the special (medical) position of genetic 
information discussed here thus prove unconvincing. That said, not only is the line 
dividing genetic from non-genetic factors is diffuse, but also it is not clear what 
exactly “genetic” means. Put differently: What we have here is thus not a definitional 
problem that results from an impermissible conflation or erroneous shift of the line 
dividing two essentially distinguishable components (genetic/non-genetic); instead, it 
is a systematic problem that lies in the “nature” of the matter at hand. What is 
respectively termed a “gene” or “genetic” entails great semantic flexibility and 
depends on the respective scientific definition and social context.42  
 
3.2.  Genetic or non-genetic? 
 
The concept of genetic illness has been constantly expanded in recent decades. Today, 
genetic factors are considered to be responsible not only for “monogenetic” illnesses 
(so-called congenital illnesses), but also for multifactored diseases such as cancer, 
Alzheimer’s, diabetes and many other widely-spread illnesses. This semantic 
expansion has gone hand in hand with a shift in meaning such that illnesses are 
increasingly construed as genetic deviations from the norm. However: If every illness 
can potentially be ascribed to genetic changes, it becomes questionable what exactly 
the contribution made by genetic factors is and/or how genetic causes of illnesses are 
to be distinguished from their non-genetic counterparts.43 
 
It is not only impossible to finally and definitively state what distinguishes a genetic 
illness from a non-genetic complaint; it is likewise unclear how genetic analyses can 
be distinguished sharply from non-genetic analyses. “Genetic diagnostics” is the 
umbrella term used to cover all types of diagnosis of genetically determined illnesses 
and features. This includes tests at the level of DNA as well as phenotypical diagnoses 
(such as the test for genetically conditioned colour blindness), chromosome 
examinations and analyses at the level of genetic products.44  
 
Joseph S. Alper and Jon Beckwith rightly point out that this comprehensive definition 
of genetic tests applies to practically all clinical test procedures. They emphasize that 
most medical tests focus on diagnosing abnormal concentrations of biochemical units. 
Typically, these units are proteins that are generated directly by genes, or molecules 
whose synthesis depends to a more or less large degree on the activity of the genes. 
Which is why a striking biochemical finding can be the result of a changed gene or 
genotype. Even if these non-genetic tests focus on determining the function of the 
various organs, they possibly also provide information on genetic characteristics. In 
addition, in some cases only the medical context can decide whether a genetic or a 
non-genetic test is involved: “A test of blood cholesterol concentration may be 
regarded as genetic when testing an individual with a family history of 
hypercholesterolemia, a single gene recessive disorder. The same test is clearly a non-
genetic medical test when ordered in the course of a routine physical examination.”45 
 
It follows that genetic diseases cannot be exclusively detected by means of genetic 
testing (or, to be more precise, DNA diagnostics). In many cases, conventional 
screening procedures can reliably prove the existence of a genetic condition. The fact 
that a distinction between genetic and other diagnostic devices is not merely a 
technical matter can be seen from the history of the PKU screening as reconstructed 
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by Diane Paul. PKU is a metabolic illness where an enzyme defect prevents the 
amino-acid phenylalanine being transformed into tyrosine. However, initiating a 
special diet when the patient is still a child can largely offset this problem. When, in 
the 1960s, the so-called Guthrie Test was developed and used as a diagnostic tool with 
newborn infants, the genetic dimension of the disease played no role; instead, back 
then PKU was considered a treatable form of mental retardation. Moreover, the 
method used to prove its existence is a biochemical test, not DNA-level screening. 
Only much later did the Guthrie Test come to be regarded as a genetic test and PKU 
as a genetic condition – a label that served various interests at the same time. The 
molecular medicine visionaries were able to point to the PKU Test to demonstrate that 
genetic tests exist that does provide a therapeutic benefit. That said, critics of genetic 
screening also profited from the label “genetic test”. In the framework of the Human 
Genome Project, commissions were set up in the United States and various other 
countries to specifically regulate genetic analyses (in contrast to other medical tests). 
Since genetic screening requires greater technical care and more intensive legal 
regulation than do other methods, the definition of the PKU Test as a genetic test was 
also of interest to critics of genetic determinism who are sceptical of the increasing 
use of genetic screening.46  
 
It is obviously not only difficult to distinguish with any scientific precision between 
genetic and non-genetic diseases. Moreover, the dividing line between genetic and 
non-genetic tests can also not be defined intrinsically in technical terms. As we saw, in 
the final instance the difference is the product of social negotiations and scientific 
compromises. This insight has a strong impact on political initiatives that endeavour 
to regulate the use of genetic data by means of special anti-discrimination legislation.  
 
4.  Normative ambivalences: the legal privilege of genetic information 
 
Discrimination on the basis of genetic factors is directed against “asymptomatic ill 
persons”47, while discrimination of ill and disabled persons results in unequal 
treatment on the basis of phenotypic features. Generally, the former is considered 
more problematic in moral and legal terms than the latter, which leads to a 
asymmetrical treatment of those suffering from discriminatory practices. First, genetic 
and non-genetic discrimination are treated differently in legal terms, which prompts 
the question what criteria are used to justify such an unequal treatment of persons who 
are equally affected by discriminatory practices. Second, there is the danger that the 
exceptional legal status of genetic discrimination simply “normalizes” all non-genetic 
forms of discrimination. If in the widest variety of different social areas the disabled 
and the ill are regularly discriminated against compared with the healthy, then this 
appears legitimate to the extent special protection exists for persons who are affected 
by practices of genetic discrimination.48 Put differently: the concentration on the legal 
impermissibility and moral reprehensibility of genetic discrimination isolates different 
forms of discrimination, plays them off against one another, and threatens to augment 
the social acceptance of practices of non-genetic discrimination.  
 
Gregor Wolbring has pointed out that in principle two completely different strategies 
for legal policy are conceivable in order to prevent discrimination against 
asymptomatic ill persons. The one path could be to extend and expand existing anti-
discrimination legislation on the equal treatment of the disabled such that it equally 
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covers discrimination against the asymptomatic and symptomatic, the genetic and the 
non-genetic ill. However, at present a quite different approach is being taken in the 
United States and many other countries that envisage special laws to protect the 
asymptomatic ill. The laws or legislative projects currently being negotiated are based 
on a strict and unequivocal distinction between the asymptomatic and symptomatic ill. 
Wolbring points out that this serves to increase the legal gap between the two groups 
of persons affected. Instead of grasping genetic discrimination as an integral part of a 
social continuum of discriminatory practices, it is considered as a specific caesura to 
be distinguished in conceptual and normative terms from other forms of 
disadvantaging. As Wolbring rightly remarks, it is however questionable whether 
discrimination against the asymptomatic ill would exist without discrimination against 
the symptomatic ill and the disabled.49 
 
Strikingly, there are differences in the legal and moral appraisal not only as regards 
the symptomatic as opposed to asymptomatic ill, but also within the group of the 
asymptomatic ill. A distinction is made there between persons affected by genetic 
risks and those exposed to non-genetic risks of illness. Both sections of the group 
share the fact that the illness is not yet developed, and will possibly never do so, but 
the legal evaluation of the risks is completely different. The problem is perhaps best 
illustrated by juxtaposing two similar cases that were decided almost simultaneously 
in the same federal state of Germany.  
 
4.1.  “From the cradle” – The rebirth of genetic essentialism as anti 
 discrimination policy 
 
The first case was recently taken up by various media and found a lot of attention 
inside and outside Germany.50 In August 2003, the State of Hessen refused to employ 
a teacher as a civil servant after she had completed her trial period. The enquiry by the 
officially appointed occupational physician had revealed that the young woman’s 
father suffered from Huntington’s Disease.51 The report came to the conclusion that at 
the present point in time the applicant’s health was suitable to enable her to take up 
the job, but she was barred from becoming a civil servant on the ground that there was 
an increased probability that she would fall ill in the foreseeable future and become 
enduringly unfit to discharge her duties. The applicant lodged an appeal against this 
decision before the Administrative Court in Darmstadt, which ruled mainly in her 
favour and instructed the State of Hessen to immediately appoint her to government 
service. In the court’s opinion, the school authorities had wrongly assessed the state of 
her health as an applicant, as they had claimed that the 50-percent risk of illness 
meant there was a “most strong probability” she would enduringly not be able to 
discharge her duties. The school board declined to contest the decision and has since 
employed the woman in question under a government service contract.52  
 
At the same time, another case was before the courts but attracted far less public 
attention. Again in Hessen, a young man was dismissed while still on probation for 
government service, as in the opinion of his employers given his weight of 120 kg his 
health was not suited for a career in general administration. Here again the applicant 
took the matter before the courts. However, in its ruling the Frankfurt Administrative 
Court confirmed that the dismissal was legal as the employer was permitted to pre-
empt the risk of having to foot the bill for later enduring damage to the man’s health.53 
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In other words, although the applicant was not yet ill and it is completely uncertain 
whether and in what way his elevated body weight might impair his health in the 
future he was treated in legal terms as though he were already incapable of pursuing 
his duties. 
 
These examples show that the distinction between genetic and non-genetic 
information cannot serve as the basis for legal differentiation. First, it is not 
intelligible why, for example, the use of biochemical methods that allow making 
inferences on a person’s genetic disposition is permissible for discriminatory 
purposes, while DNA tests, that reach the same results, are forbidden. It would seem 
not only fairly impractical but also unfair to prohibit an insurance company from 
evaluating a genetic analysis for a complex disease, while the results of a non-genetic 
test for the same illness may be relied on. This methodology essentially creates a legal 
situation in which people with positive genetic diagnoses receive more protection 
against discrimination and data abuse than those whose findings are based on non-
genetic methods: “Would the law mean that the records of a person with a 
presymptomatic heart condition who was given a genetic test for some mutant gene 
associated with heart disease would be covered by anti-discrimination provisions, but 
not the records of a person with the same condition whose physician order only 
nongenetic tests?”54  
 
Second, it remains unclear why institutional actors such as insurance companies or 
employers should be forbidden from using a source of genetic information (genetic 
screening) although they are allowed to draw on other forms of genetic knowledge. 
For example, according to a draft by the German Health Ministry for a bill on genetic 
diagnostics, an insurance company would be prohibited from demanding that a 
woman who a BRCA test shows as positive for breast cancer pay a higher insurance 
premium, whereas this is permissible with regard to a woman who has preferred not to 
undergo genetic screening but in whose family several women have already had 
breast cancer.55 This asymmetric decision-making principle not only violates the 
principle of fairness, but also means we must fear that such a regulation will compel 
people to opt for genetic analyses even if they did not originally want to – for 
example, in order to get insurance policies (at standard conditions).56  
 
Third, the increasing discovery of genetic factors for the genesis of illnesses will in 
future make it ever harder to draw a line between genetic and non-genetic conditions. 
With reference to the above-mentioned case, a series of research findings could be 
cited, for example, that point to a genetic component in obesity.57 What would the 
judgment be if an applicant could credibly claim that a specific genetic disposition is 
(co-) responsible for his increased body weight? Would we then be confronted by a 
case of genetic discrimination and would need to specially protect those concerned 
from it?  
 
To summarize, we can say that the emphasis of anti-discrimination policies is 
evidently more on the (genetic) “nature” of information and less on social practices in 
which these data are used and evaluated.58 The legislation to protect against genetic 
discrimination are not least the product of the implicit notion that genes 
fundamentally influence human existence and constitute the core of each personality. 
It is accordingly unfair to punish persons for something that they cannot themselves 
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control.59 This logic is also to be found in the justifications given by the German 
Health Ministry for the planned legislation on genetic diagnostics. The statement in 
question says that any form of genetic discrimination must be countered: “For our 
genetic characteristics ‘are with us in the cradle’ and we are therefore not responsible 
for them”.60 This argument may initially seem plausible, but on closer inspection is 
not very convincing, as it is based on the idea of a genetic program that is 
“responsible” for the development and identity of individuals and that both constitutes 
and constraints their scope for action. It is the assumption of a particular power and 
autonomy of genetic factors that forms the basis for their privileged legal status. In 
principle, there are many non-genetic factors that are just as little susceptible to 
personal control although we do not call for them to be specifically protected. It is by 
no means evident why a person whose higher risk of contracting a specific type of 
cancer, say, is attributable to genetic factors, should enjoy greater protection than 
some one whose health is threatened by environmental factors such as poor working 
conditions or polluted air. Should not this group of persons likewise be effectively 
protected?61 
 
We can assume that the explicit withdrawal of responsibility in the case of genetic 
risks of illness is the other side of the coin of an increasing ascription of responsibility 
for all non-genetic factors.62 The reductionist concept of genetic fatalism that 
purportedly unravel automatically and independently of the individual person’s will 
contrasts with the radicalized appeal to personal responsibility and personal 
accountability as regards health and the prevention of illness.63 Possibly, the different 
judgments in the two afore-mentioned cases stem from a shared underlying logic that 
places the question of personal responsibility at the centre of things. Increased body 
weight and the resulting risks to a person’s health are essentially considered the 
(erroneous) result of individual choice, while the risk of contracting Morbus 
Huntington is viewed as biological fate and thus treated as something for which a 
person cannot be held responsible. 
 
5.  Critical paradoxes  
 
The call to distinguish genetic discrimination from other types of discrimination and 
subject it to special legislation has a paradoxical impact. The prohibition on the 
“unequal treatment” of people with an “abnormal” genetic constitution reinforces the 
cultural belief in the exceptional status of genetic factors, something which the legal 
regulation was supposed to counter in the first place. The analysis and critique of 
genetic discrimination itself relies on the phantasm that genes forms the “blueprint” 
for an individual and the “secret of life”.64 In this way, the anti-discrimination 
legislation threatens to intensify the very problem it set out to solve. This brings us up 
against a key dilemma.65 On the one side, there are practices of genetic discrimination 
and people who suffer from these practices and, on the other, genetic essentialism is 
rejuvenated and reinforced by the academic and legal confirmation of the special role 
of genetic factors. 
 
This dilemma by no means signifies that legal stipulations to protect people with 
genetic peculiarities are superfluous or even damaging. On the contrary, even if 
genetic information, seen scientifically, should be accorded no privileged role over 
non-genetic data, in social reality they quite obviously have a pronounced 
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importance.66 In cultural terms, genes symbolize something fateful and immutable67, 
are considered “the most intimate biological property that we have”68 and are thought 
to decisively influence the individual course of life69. Unlike other health risks, that 
are temporary, treatable, and can essentially be eliminated, genes are construed as the 
basis for a person’s identity. He or she is said to “carry” or “possess” not only genetic 
risks, these are actually considered to be an integral part of the person’s physical 
existence.70 If genetic factors are made responsible for a disease, then the person 
affected feels they are not controllable and are thus more threatening than if non-
genetic reasons are cited.71 Equally, the risk of genetic illness cannot be separated 
from the history of eugenics, the cataloguing and murdering of people who were 
considered “genetically inferior”, from a trans-generational notion of illness and the 
idea of “defective” or “poor” genes.72 As long as this cultural stereotype and historical 
prejudice persists, and people are disadvantaged or shown disrespect owing to their 
genetic peculiarities, it is imperative to legally protect them.  
 
However, such legal protection must not result in genetic data being isolated form 
other (predictive) medical information. Genetic discrimination is the result of an 
increasing extension of the concept of illness and disability and the expansion of 
existing practices of contempt, stigmatization and exclusion. For this reason, the 
prohibition on genetic discrimination must necessarily be supplemented by profound 
institutional reforms and comprehensive regulations that more effectively protect 
persons already ill or disabled from social exclusion and disadvantage.73 That said, it 
is also necessary to rethink the analysis and critique of genetic discrimination with a 
view to its premises and goals. Otherwise we would run the risk of the distinction 
between genetic and non-genetic leading us to ignore the more fundamental question 
of the way (predictive) medical information is in general used to categorize persons, 
attribute characteristics and features to them, and exclude them from particular 
benefits.74 In the absence of such dual self-enlightenment, the critique of genetic 
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